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COMMENTS ON MINNESOTA LAWS, 1943, CHAPTER
529, RELATING TO LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS
AFFECTING TITLE TO REAL ESTATE*
By GEORGE M. MALONEY**
T HE MAJOR question confronting a lawyer when consider-
ing Chapter 529 of Minnesota Laws of 1943 is whether a title
examiner can take a 50 year abstract and pay no attention to what
may have happened in the title prior to that time. The discussion
that follows will be limited principally to that question. Chapter 529
appears to have been patterned after Chapter 293 of the Wisconsin
Laws of 1931, although Wisconsin imposes a 30 year rather than a
50 year limitation period. A note in the Harvard Law Review refers
to the Wisconsin statute as the most far reaching expedient yet
adopted' to restore the effectiveness of the recording system in
validating transactions in land.' The Minnesota statute is not,
however, an exact copy of the Wisconsin statute. Such weaknesses
as it has, or, in any event, its principal weakness, are due to its de-
partures from its model.
The Minnesota statute is undoubtedly constitutional in a broad
sense, and there appears to be ample support for the proposition
that a person may constitutionally be required to record evidence
of a pre-existing or vested right. That is what the Wisconsin statute
does, among other things. Any doubt on this point is removed by
the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Klasen v. Thompson2
in which the question arose whether a statute requiring the record-
ing of a tax certificate could constitutionally require a person who
had previously purchased a tax certificate to record it. The Court
decided that this could be required.
The Minnesota statute, in requiring a man to record a notice of
his rights, follows the Wisconsin pattern, and is undoubtedly consti-
tutional. Had it stopped there, it would probably have been a more
effective law. Unfortunately, it went farther, and in Section 2 re-
quires the bringing of an action within one year from the filing of
the notice and states that, unless such action is so commenced, all
*This article comprises the substance of a discussion on the same statute
as that involved in the article on page 23, which occurred at the, same meeting
as that at which said article was read.
**Of the Minneapolis bar.
1(1942) 55 Harvard Law Rev. 886.
2(1933) 189 Minn. 254, 248 N. W. 817. See also 121 A. L. R. 909.
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rights under said notice shall terminate. Now this is perfectly all
right so far as a matured cause of action is concerned. But what
about the case of a remainderman who is merely waiting for an
octogenarian life tenant to pass on, and who has filed his notice?
What action can he bring? Suppose, for example, and this is some-
thing that is not wildly imaginative at all, that in 1893 a 25 year old
father died leaving his homestead to his 24 year old wife and- a five
year old son. The widow quit claims to Jones. Of course he re-
ceives only a life estate, because that is all the widow had to convey.
Today the widow is 76 years old, which is not an improbable age. To
comply with Chapter 529 the son would have to file a notice before
January 1, 1944. That, quite probably, he can constitutionally be re-
quired to do. Then the statute says that within one year from the fil-
ing of such notice he must bring an action or his rights will be ter-
minated. Supposing that son were to consult his lawyer as to what
action he could bring, what would counsel tell him? The grantee of
the life tenant is living on the land, and the life tenant is still alive.
Just what action could be brought against the grantee of the life ten-
ant? He is in legal possession of the property. He isn't contesting
the rights of the remainderman. The remainderman is simply wait-
ing for the life tenant to die, and then go in and take the estate. In
other words, the life tenant's right to possession of the property
is perfectly consistent with the existence of a remainder. Jones'
claim antedates the 50 year statute. If the assumption that there is
no proper action for the son to bring be correct, then are we not in
a situation where the statute requires a man literally to do that
which is impossible and which, nevertheless, is a prerequisite to re-
taining his legal estate?
Also the question arises, can a trustee on a long term trust deed
be required to foreclose before maturity in the absence of a default?
This isn't just a matter of having to record the notice. That, quite
probably, is constitutional. No, the statute says that he must, with-
in a year from the recording of, his notice, bring action or his
rights are terminated. Here is a trust deed, not matured and not in
default; just what action is the trustee under that trust deed going
to bring? If anyone thinks that he can bring an action or that he
can be forced to bring an action as a prerequisite to retaining his
right, it is suggested that he read the case of Jentzen v. Pruter.
In that case the Court was confronted with our mortgage statute
of limitations passed in 1909. It involved the question of whether
3(1921) 148 Minn. 8, 180 N. W. 1004.
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that statute could affect a rfhortgage which had been taken prior to
that time and force a man into action where the mortgage itself
had not matured. The Court, in the opinion, said:
"The legislature had' no constitutional power to limit the time
to commence an action to vindicate a right under an existing con-
tract to a date anterior to the inception of any cause of action arising
out of the contract. A statute, which in this manner bars the exist-
ing contract rights of claimants without affording them an oppor-
tunity to assert them, is not a statute of limitations, but an attempt
to arbitrarily impair the obligation of the contract. . . . The statute
must be held to have no application to a conveyance made before its
passage and given to secure an obligation not maturing within 15
years from its date."
It is, therefore, practically certain that it will be necessary to
read this statute in the light of the possible existence of long term
trust deeds, life estates, and long term leases. In Hennepin Count3
a thing we have to consider, which is very serious, is old condition
subsequent clauses, that is liquor clauses, *with forfeiture pro-
visions. In examining rural abstracts, support bonds are very fre-
quently encountered. These are not merely occasional occurrences in
title, but they are uncomfortably frequent, and to ignore those cre-
ated prior to 1896 will involve considerable risk. Therefore, it is clear
that we cannot safely pass the title for a client by simply saying that
there is a patent from the United States, and then jumping down to
1896. Incidentally, Mr. Brehfner did not mention the matter of the
rights of the United States, but it will probably be generally con-
ceded that, if a 50 year abstract is taken, it will still be necessary to
see to it that there was a patent from the United States, because
there can be no dispute with the proposition that no state statute of
limitations can bar the rights of the United States in its own
property.
Now another feature that is common to both our statute and
that of Wisconsin is the requirement that he who disregards claims
over 50 years old must deal with a person'in possession, if any,
and be a bona fide -purchaser. Should an argument arise in Wiscon-
sin as to the marketability of a title by reason of a 30 year old claim,
the seller's attorney could at least put an affidavit on record to show
who was in possession. There is a statute in Wisconsin which has
been in force for a number of years permitting the filing of affidavits
with reference to possession of property and giving them a prima
facie effect. In Minnesota there is no such statute. In fact, a person
with such an affidavit might push it over on the register of deeds,
but it is not supposed to be recorded.
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Even in Wisconsin there might be a difference of opinion be-
tween two attorneys. The seller's attorney might say, "The deed's
alleged title defect is over 30 years old, and therefore we can dis-
regard anything before that." The buyer's attorney might say,
"No. Here is the position you are in. Your client may have bought
this property in blissful ignorance of this ancient defect, but I have
examined the full chain of title and I know about it, and therefore
my client is not a bona fide purchaser as against that defect." The
question really is, what does the statute mean by "bona fide pur-
chaser"? If it means, as it is likely to be construed, someone with
no notice of a more than 50 year old claim, then'our statute does
not seem to be very effective in permitting disregard of things over
50 years old. Now this last observation, while it may seem facetious,
is, in fact, serious, because if it be conceded that examiners will
have to go back in the chain of title beyond the 50 year period to
check the existence of long term trust deeds, conditions sub-
sequent, and the like, then in perusing the abstract other defects
are going to be discovered which will deprive the client of his status
as a bona fide purchaser.
The statute affords strong moral support for passing many of
the defects in title which have been passed in the past. The Henne-
pin County Title Examiners, and the Examiners in other parts of
the state, have for the most part been willing to rely upon cases
such as the Benjamin v. Savage case cited by Mr. Brehmer, but
if one meets some fellow who has got to have it written in the
statute, the fact that the Supreme Court may have said that such
and such a title is good doesn't carry very much weight. The Title
Examiners in Hennepin County desire a statute of the nature
of 529 as amended by Chapter 124, and would probably lean
towards a 40 year rather than a 50 year law, because it is that much
more helpful. It might even be possible to go as far as Wisconsin
and have a 30 or 35 year law. Such a statute should, however, be
silent as to the matter of dealing with those in possession and
should not make possession a test. The courts will take care of that.
It is known, of course, that a man who is in possession of land can-
not be barred of his rights by any statute of limitations. There is no
question about that. You cannot force the man who is on the
ground, enjoying his estate, to go into court and assert his rights.
He has got them. It is for somebody else who is going to attack
him and get him out to do that. Furthermore, so far as the rights of
4(1923) 154 Minn. 159, 191 N. W. 408.
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the person in possession are concerned, in our title opinion it is
customary to tell the client he is bound to know the rights of those
in possession. So, if by any chance anyone is in possession of the
50 year old claim, there is no need to mention it. Under the statute
the court will take care of that, and the examiner is amply pro-
tected with his clients. The trouble with this business of being in
possession and a bona fide purchaser is that we are trying to cure
a record defect by non-record facts. Here the man says, "It is a
defect. It is a matter of record." How is one going to get into the
record this matter that the man who is buying the property is a bona
fide purchaser afid is dealing with the man in possession? In other
words, we have a fine statute of limitations as against the man who
has a 50 year old claim, but we probably do not have a statute of
limitations which makes the title a good marketable title of record.
In Minneapolis there' exists a bad situation with reference to
liquor clauses affecting a great deal of property all over South Min-
neapolis around Lake Harriet and Lake Calhoun. The former owner
who drew them knew how to draw a condition subsequent, and in-
serted these clauses in his deeds. They are still there and he is dead,
and his wife is dead. His only daughter is dead. She was left as sole
devisee under his will. Attorneys dealt with her at $25 ,per quit claim
deed. It was a racket. The alternative was an action to quiet title, or
registration of the title. All of us would be happy over there, as far
as conditions subsequent and forfeiture clauses are concerned, if an
annual recording were required, giving two months' leeway to en-
force rights. In our particular situation this statute gives no relief
because affidavits have been filed in the last 50 years. The daughter
filed an affidavit saying that she was the sole heir-at-law of the
owner.
